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Constitutional and Interpretive
Shortcomings of the Flight-Risk Standard
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Pretrial detention seriously restricts the physical liberty of presumptively innocent people who have yet to be tried and convicted. The Bail Reform Act (BRA) imposes several procedural requirements that must be satisfied before a judge can
order the pretrial detention of a federal defendant. At a detention hearing, the BRA
allows a judge to order the pretrial detention of an arrestee who poses either a danger
to the community or a flight risk. The BRA states unequivocally that a finding of
dangerousness must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, but the statute
is silent as to the evidentiary standard for establishing a defendant’s flight risk. In
the absence of statutory guidance, the courts of appeals have utilized a “preponderance of the evidence” standard.
This Comment contends that the preponderance standard for flight risk is unconstitutional and interpretively incorrect. In cases involving similar government
restrictions on physical liberty, the Supreme Court has generally required at least a
“clear and convincing evidence” standard to comport with due process. Using these
cases as a baseline, this Comment applies the Mathews v. Eldridge due process
framework to reveal the constitutional infirmity of the preponderance standard for
pretrial flight risk.
In making the interpretive argument for a clear and convincing evidence
standard, this Comment dissects the BRA’s legislative history and statutory evolution to show that Congress intended for flight risk and dangerousness to be
considered under equivalent standards. This Comment concludes by making a constitutional avoidance argument: there exists (1) a serious question as to the constitutional validity of the preponderance standard for flight risk and (2) a plausible
interpretation of the BRA—that flight risk ought to be proven by clear and
convincing evidence—that avoids those constitutional concerns.
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INTRODUCTION
Pretrial detention—the jailing of presumptively innocent
people who have yet to be tried and convicted—is supposed to be
reserved for the most serious cases. As the Supreme Court emphasized in United States v. Salerno,1 “In our society liberty is the
norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully
limited exception.”2 Bail—the pretrial release of a defendant,
sometimes with conditions attached to secure one’s appearance in
court—is an important safeguard of this fundamental American
liberty. The Salerno Court noted that the Bail Reform Act of 19843
(BRA), which governs federal pretrial detention, “carefully limits
1
2
3

481 U.S. 739 (1987).
Id. at 755.
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3150).
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the circumstances under which detention may be sought to the
most serious of crimes” in order to preserve the liberty of
defendants awaiting trial.4 Although the BRA authorizes detention in some circumstances, it establishes a “clear preference for
pretrial release.”5 Bail is supposed to be the rule, and pretrial detention the exception.
In practice, however, federal pretrial detention “is in crisis.”6
The “exception has now swallowed the rule, becoming a built-in
bias for incarceration that feeds the federal system’s colossal detention rates and stark racial disparities.”7 Over the last forty
years, the pretrial detention rate has risen from 17% to 75%,8 disproportionately impacting people of color.9 Against this backdrop,
recent scholarship has focused on substantive problems with the
text of the BRA and its application in practice.10
Yet one aspect of the BRA has received scant academic or judicial attention: the evidentiary standard for detaining a defendant who poses a flight risk. The BRA currently authorizes pretrial
detention upon a finding at a detention hearing that the arrestee
poses either a danger to the community or a risk of nonappearance at trial.11 To detain a person based on dangerousness, the
statute provides that “[t]he facts the judicial officer uses . . . shall
be supported by clear and convincing evidence.”12 Notably, the
statute does not specify an evidentiary standard for evaluating an
arrestee’s flight risk. In the absence of statutory instruction, the
federal courts of appeals have concluded that flight risk must be
4

Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747.
Stephanie Holmes Didwania, Discretion and Disparity in Federal Detention, 115
NW. U. L. REV. 1261, 1278 (2021).
6
Alison Siegler & Erica Zunkel, Rethinking Federal Bail Advocacy to Change the
Culture of Detention, CHAMPION 46 (July 2020), https://perma.cc/GA48-BY6Z.
7
Alison Siegler & Kate M. Harris, How Did the “Worst of the Worst” Become 3 out
of 4?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2021), https://perma.cc/JN6N-LKVL.
8
See Didwania, supra note 5, at 1264.
9
See id. at 1266.
10 See generally, e.g., Amaryllis Austin, The Presumption for Detention Statute’s Relationship to Release Rates, 81 FED. PROB. 52 (2017) (criticizing the presumptions of detention codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3412(e) that attach to certain charges); Erica Zunkel &
Alison Siegler, The Federal Judiciary’s Role in Drug Law Reform in an Era of Congressional Dysfunction, 18 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 283 (2020) (exposing the statutory drug presumption as overbroad and ineffective); Cynthia E. Jones, Accused and Unconvicted: Fleeing from Wealth-Based Pretrial Detention, 82 ALB. L. REV. 1063 (2018) (scrutinizing the
overreliance on financial conditions of release); Sandra G. Mayson, Detention by Any Other
Name, 69 DUKE L.J. 1643 (2020) (critiquing unaffordable bail); Didwania, supra note 5
(identifying race- and gender-based disparities in federal pretrial detention).
11 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
12 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
5
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proven by the less demanding “preponderance of the evidence”
standard.13 This Comment argues that, as a constitutional and
interpretive matter, the pretrial flight-risk determination must
be evaluated under a “clear and convincing evidence” standard.14
The preponderance standard not only makes it easier to jail
presumptively innocent people but also increases the likelihood of
erroneous detentions.15 What’s more, pretrial detention imposes
severe consequences on people held prior to trial, regardless of
whether the detention is legally valid. The average length of federal pretrial detention is eight months, with some districts’ averages exceeding two and a half years.16 During that time, detainees
“can lose their jobs, their homes, their health, and even their children,” all while detention “increases the likelihood of conviction
and results in longer federal sentences.”17 A preponderance standard makes these consequences substantially more likely; as the
Supreme Court has recognized, “Increasing the burden of proof is
one way to . . . reduce the chances that inappropriate [detentions]
will be ordered.”18
This Comment explains why the current preponderance
standard for flight risk is unconstitutional and interpretively incorrect. Part I briefly discusses the history of bail in the United
States, the mechanics of the BRA, and the development of the
preponderance standard among the circuits. Part II argues that
the preponderance standard for flight risk is unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence has required a
clear and convincing evidence standard for forms of nonpunitive
detention analogous to pretrial jailing. Part III makes the interpretive argument for a clear and convincing evidence standard. It
begins by illuminating that several aspects of the BRA—
including the statute’s history and structure—point toward a
clear and convincing evidence threshold. It concludes by applying
the constitutional avoidance canon to this interpretive question;
the preponderance standard raises a serious constitutional question that can be avoided by a plausible construction of the statute.
13

See, e.g., United States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1406-07 (9th Cir. 1985).
See Siegler & Zunkel, supra note 6, at 51 n.102 (noting that the preponderance
standard may fail constitutional scrutiny).
15 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979) (holding that in civil commitment
proceedings, the preponderance standard does not satisfy due process).
16 Siegler & Zunkel, supra note 6, at 47 (citing Austin, supra note 10, at 53).
17 Id.
18 Addington, 441 U.S. at 427 (explaining the due process rationale for adopting a
higher evidentiary standard in civil commitment proceedings).
14
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I. BACKGROUND: LEGAL HISTORY OF THE BRA AND FLIGHT-RISK
STANDARD
This Part describes the historical and statutory context of the
preponderance standard for the pretrial flight-risk assessment. It
first explores the history of bail and the enactment of the BRA
before situating the flight-risk determination within the statutory scheme. It concludes by discussing the reasoning that circuits have used in selecting a preponderance standard for flightrisk determinations.
A. Origin of the 1984 BRA
Bail was an integral part of Anglo-American criminal
procedure long before the BRA.19 Although the Framers did not
include an express right to bail in the Constitution20 (and prohibited only excessive bail via the Eighth Amendment),21 the states
continued a long tradition of allowing pretrial release subject to
financial conditions.22 A judge would require a defendant to secure
personal surety for an amount that would be forfeited should the
defendant fail to appear in court.23 A defendant would have “a
friend or neighbor take a pledge, backed by property, and assume
responsibility for him until trial.”24 Eventually, the bail system
became commercialized; rather than having a personal acquaintance secure their bonds, defendants turned to commercial bail
bondsmen.25
Before Congress overhauled the bail system in 1966, persons
charged with noncapital offenses had “an absolute right to be
admitted to bail” granted by statute.26 The Supreme Court had
recognized the fundamental importance of pretrial release: “This

19 See Matthew J. Hegreness, America’s Fundamental and Vanishing Right to Bail,
55 ARIZ. L. REV. 909, 916–19 (2013) (surveying the history of bail in the United States
since 1776).
20 Eric J. Maier, Comment, Schrödinger’s Cell: Pretrial Detention, Supervised Release, and Uncertainty, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1425, 1431 (2017).
21 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
22 Alexa Van Brunt & Locke E. Bowman, Toward a Just Model of Pretrial Release: A
History of Bail Reform and a Prescription for What’s Next, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
701, 713 (2019) (noting that state constitutions in “the early days of the republic” frequently included a right to bail).
23 Maier, supra note 20, at 1431.
24 Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment,
& the Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1324 (2012).
25 Id. at 1329.
26 United States v. Weiss, 233 F.2d 463, 465 (7th Cir. 1956).
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traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction.”27 The Court emphasized
that “[u]nless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle,
would lose its meaning.”28 Even before the BRA, some members of
the Court acknowledged that the right to pretrial freedom could
outweigh a defendant’s flight risk: “[B]ail always involves a risk
that the accused will take flight. That is a calculated risk which
the law takes as the price of our system of justice.”29
Leading up to 1966, however, the commercial bondsman system came under increasing scrutiny for failing to adequately incentivize defendants to show up to trial.30 In an effort to resolve
this issue, Congress passed the Bail Reform Act of 196631 (1966
BRA) to allow the pretrial release of defendants under conditions
other than financial collateral, such as restrictions on travel or
association.32 The statute required the release of persons charged
with noncapital offenses unless “such a release [would] not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required.”33 The
1966 BRA limited the purpose of bail to securing one’s appearance
at trial.34 In this way, the 1966 BRA altered the bail process by
allowing judges to order pretrial detention in noncapital cases if
release would be inadequate to reasonably secure an arrestee’s
appearance at trial.35 The 1966 BRA “was not attempting to deal
with evaluating defendants’ dangerousness during the bail inquiry,”36 just their risk of nonappearance.

27

Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
Id.
29 Id. at 8 (Jackson, J., concurring).
30 See Betsy Kushlan Wanger, Note, Limiting Preventive Detention Through Conditional Release: The Unfulfilled Promise of the 1982 Pretrial Services Act, 97 YALE L.J. 320,
324 (1987) (“The pecuniary commitment of a commercial bail bondsman did not necessarily reflect the defendant’s own stake in appearing at trial or in ceasing to engage in
criminal activity.”).
31 Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (1966), amended by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3150.
32 See Maier, supra note 20, at 1432, 1434-35.
33 Bail Reform Act of 1966 § 3146(a), 80 Stat. at 214.
34 See Maier, supra note 20, at 1433.
35 Id.
36 Mani S. Walia, Putting the “Mandatory” Back in the Mandatory Detention Act, 85
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 177, 192 (2011) (emphasis added); see also H.R. REP. NO. 89-1541, at 3
(1966), as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2293, 2296 (“[P]retrial bail may not be used as
a device to protect society from the possible commission of additional crimes by the
accused.”).
28
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By 1984, nonappearance was no longer Congress’s sole concern on the matter of pretrial release. Congress sought to “address the alarming problem of crimes committed by persons on
release.”37 Amending the earlier BRA, the 1984 BRA dramatically
shifted the federal bail landscape by permitting judges to consider
both a defendant’s flight risk and dangerousness in the detention
decision.38
B. Mechanics of the BRA
Although the 1984 BRA sought in part to address the dangerousness of defendants released before trial, it creates a presumption of release in most cases by limiting the types of offenses that
qualify for detention.39 The BRA splits the bail process into two
stages: an initial appearance hearing and a detention hearing.40
Generally, arrestees are to be released at the initial appearance
subject to the least restrictive conditions that will reasonably
assure their appearance and the safety of the community.41 These
conditions include employment requirements, curfew, and restrictions on the possession of firearms.42
To proceed from the initial appearance to the detention
hearing—and ultimately to detain a defendant—a judge must
find certain predicates satisfied at the initial appearance. In other
words, arrestees must be released at the initial appearance except
in specific circumstances that permit a judge to hold a subsequent
detention hearing. In § 3142(f), the BRA identifies five categories
of charged offenses that render a defendant eligible for a detention hearing: most drug and gun crimes, offenses involving a
minor victim, crimes of violence and terrorism, offenses with a
maximum penalty of life in prison or death, and certain instances
of recidivism.43 A judge may also proceed from an initial appearance to a detention hearing in cases involving “a serious risk that

37 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 3 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3185. Despite this alarmism, the Senate Report emphasized that this group of dangerous releasees
was “small but identifiable.” Id. at 6.
38 See Walia, supra note 36, at 193–97 (arguing that the 1984 BRA departed from
the 1966 BRA by allowing judges to consider dangerousness before ordering release).
39 Didwania, supra note 5, at 1278 (2021); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b)–(c).
40 See Siegler & Zunkel, supra note 6, at 49 (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747); see also
Bail, 50 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 394, 397–400 (2021) [hereinafter Bail].
41 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b), (c)(1)(B).
42 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B).
43 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1); Siegler & Zunkel, supra note 6, at 48.
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such person will flee”44 or “a serious risk that such person will
obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice.”45 The five offense categories, combined with flight-risk and obstruction categories, create
seven factors that authorize a pretrial detention hearing. A
finding of general dangerousness is not a consideration at the initial appearance stage and is therefore not a valid basis for a judge
to proceed to a detention hearing.46 If none of the seven factors is
present, pretrial release is obligatory and a court may not hold a
detention hearing.47 In this sense, § 3142(f) “serve[s] as a gatekeeper to [pretrial] detention.”48
If one of the seven factors is met at the initial appearance,
the judge is authorized to conduct a detention hearing.49 At this
hearing, the government bears the burden of persuading the judicial officer that no condition of release would reasonably assure
the defendant’s appearance or the safety of the community.50 A
defendant “has the right to be represented by counsel,” “crossexamine witnesses,” and “present information by proffer or otherwise” (allowing defendants to tell the court what the evidence
would show without having to present the evidence itself).51

44

18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A); see also Siegler & Zunkel, supra note 6, at 48–49.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B). The consideration of whether a defendant is a serious
flight risk under § 3142(f)(2)(A) or poses a serious risk of obstruction of justice under
§ 3142(f)(2)(B) is separate from the flight-risk determination at issue in this Comment.
Section 3142(f)(2)(A)–(B) lists factors that may allow a judge to proceed from the initial
appearance to a detention hearing. This Comment addresses the flight-risk standard at
the detention hearing—not at the initial appearance.
46 Siegler & Zunkel, supra note 6, at 48 (“[T]he statute and case law make clear that
neither ‘danger to the community’ nor ordinary ‘risk of flight’ [as opposed to serious risk
of flight] is a legitimate basis for detention at the Initial Appearance Hearing.”).
47 Id. at 49 (“[A] person may only be detained at the Initial Appearance if one of these
seven § 3142(f) factors is present.”); id. (“When no § 3142(f) factor is met, the judge is flatly
prohibited from holding a Detention Hearing; the [arrestee] must be released.”); Bail,
supra note 40, at 397 (“As the Supreme Court held in United States v. Salerno, ‘The Bail
Reform Act carefully limits the circumstances under which detention may be sought to the
most serious of crimes,’ specifically the offenses and circumstances listed in § 3142(f).”
(emphasis in original) (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747)).
48 Siegler & Zunkel, supra note 6, at 49; see also The Administration of Bail by State
and Federal Courts: A Call for Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Sec., 116th Cong. 5 (2019) (statement of Alison Siegler, Dir. Fed. Crim.
Just. Clinic, Univ. of Chi. L. Sch.) [hereinafter Administration of Bail] (“Caselaw further
supports § 3142(f)’s role as a gatekeeper. . . .[E]very court of appeals to address the issue
agrees that it is illegal to detain someone—or even hold a Detention Hearing—unless the
government affirmatively invokes one of the § 3142(f) factors.”); Administration of Bail,
supra, at 5 n.10 (collecting cases).
49 Siegler & Zunkel, supra note 6, at 48–49.
50 Id. at 52; Didwania, supra note 5, at 1281; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
51 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
45
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In light of these procedures, the Supreme Court upheld the
facial constitutionality of the BRA in Salerno, confirming that it
allows only narrow exceptions to the norm of pretrial release.52
The Court determined that pretrial detention is “regulatory”53 rather than punitive, thereby allowing less stringent protections of
the defendant’s liberty than those required at trial. For example,
the Court implicitly suggested that pretrial detention does not require the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.54 It also held that
“preventing danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory
goal.”55 According to the Court, the detention hearing protects the
defendant’s due process rights via several procedural safeguards
while preserving the government’s legitimate interest in community safety.56
One such procedural protection is the requisite burden of
proof for detaining someone prior to conviction. The BRA
explicitly says that a finding of dangerousness at the detention
hearing “shall be supported by clear and convincing evidence.”57
The Salerno Court recognized this protection as central to its decision upholding the BRA’s constitutionality.58 In contrast, the
BRA contains no specified evidentiary standard for assessing
“whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of such person as required.”59 The Court in
Salerno did not meaningfully discuss flight risk, nor did it clarify
an evidentiary threshold for proving such a risk. In the absence
of an explicit flight-risk standard, the circuits have unanimously

52

See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755.
Id. at 746–47.
54 Cf. id. at 750–51 (citing with approval the clear and convincing evidence standard).
55 Id. at 747.
56 See id. at 748-51.
57 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (“The facts the judicial officer uses to support a finding pursuant to subsection (e) that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure
the safety of any other person and the community shall be supported by clear and convincing evidence.”).
58 See Administration of Bail, supra note 48, at 5 (“A key reason the Supreme Court
upheld the Bail Reform Act as constitutional in United States v. Salerno was because the
statute only authorizes detention at the Initial Appearance under certain limited circumstances.”); id. at 7 (“The Salerno Court further relied on the narrow limitations in § 3142(f)
in another component of its substantive Due Process ruling.”); see also Salerno, 481 U.S.
at 750–51.
59 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). This Comment generally refers to the appearance assessment
as the flight-risk determination, although some scholarship has criticized the conflation
of intentional flight and unintentional nonappearance. See, e.g., Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 729–30 (2018).
53
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read in a preponderance of the evidence standard but have not
supported this conclusion with rigorous analysis.60
C. Development of the Preponderance Standard in the Circuits
Although the courts of appeals have collectively applied a
preponderance of the evidence standard to flight-risk determinations, a close examination of the development of the standard
among the circuits reveals the tenuous foundation of this
consensus.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Motamedi61
is the most thorough and influential defense of the preponderance
standard. Most significantly, the court presumed that the statute’s silence as to the flight-risk standard was a deliberate decision given the BRA’s express application of a clear and convincing
evidence standard to the dangerousness determination.62 The majority found support for this argument in the fact that § 3143 of
the BRA requires convicted persons to disprove both danger and
flight risk by clear and convincing evidence to obtain bail pending
sentencing or appeal.63 The court also concluded that because
other pretrial processes are typically governed by a preponderance standard, Congress intended that standard to apply automatically in the absence of statutory instruction to the contrary.64
Motamedi’s holding also ostensibly rested on the 1984 BRA’s
statutory evolution; the court found that Congress’s silence as to
a flight-risk standard “evinces a legislative intent to incorporate
the standard applicable to this determination under the 1966
Act.”65 The court acknowledged that the 1966 BRA also had not
expressed an evidentiary standard for flight risk but nevertheless
concluded that the 1966 BRA’s “balancing approach normally implies utilization of the preponderance standard.”66
60

See Siegler & Zunkel, supra note 6, at 51 n.102 (collecting cases).
767 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1985).
62 See id. at 1406.
63 Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a).
64 Motamedi, 767 F.2d at 1407.
65 Id. at 1406.
66 Id. at 1406-07. The BRA’s statutory evolution is addressed below in Part III, but
the balancing-approach argument fails to hold water. All standards of proof require balancing the evidence. The 1984 BRA’s dangerousness standard is illustrative: dangerousness must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, but judges are directed to balance
the factors set forth in § 3142(g). Compounding other issues with its reasoning, the
Motamedi court failed to identify any cases concluding that a balancing of factors typically
implies a preponderance standard. True, a preponderance standard requires balancing,
but so do all evidentiary standards.
61
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The other opinion to have thoroughly considered the flightrisk standard—United States v. Chimurenga67—relied on variations of these arguments. It first concluded that the “legislative
history does not suggest that any [heightened flight-risk standard] was contemplated”68 before holding that “[p]roof by a preponderance of the evidence is the standard usually used in pretrial
proceedings.”69
Subsequent appellate opinions have relied on Motamedi and
Chimurenga to establish a preponderance standard for flight-risk
determinations with little further analysis.70 The Seventh Circuit
addressed this issue for the first time in United States v. Portes.71
Its reasoning is contained in a single sentence: “We adopt the
position taken by the other circuits that congressional silence
means acquiescence in the traditional preponderance of the evidence standard.”72 In United States v. Orta,73 the Eighth Circuit
established that flight risk ought to be proven by a preponderance
of the evidence, but the entirety of its reasoning can be found in a
footnote: “The statute does not expressly state the appropriate evidentiary standard necessary to support a finding of propensity
for flight, indicating the preponderance of evidence standard usually applied in pretrial proceedings is appropriate.”74 The
Eleventh Circuit adopted a preponderance standard with similar
brevity: “Under the Act, however, the clear and convincing evidence standard applies only to a determination [of danger].”75 Despite the explosion of pretrial detention in recent years, courts

67

760 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1985).
Id. at 406. Notably, the court did not cite to any legislative history. But see
Motamedi, 767 F.2d at 1411 (Boochever, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(finding that the BRA’s legislative history shows that “Congress believed that its explicit
provision for the burden of proof on dangerousness factors paralleled the current (and
continued) standard for proof on flight risk factors”).
69 Chimurenga, 760 F.2d at 406 (first citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,
177–78 (1974); and then citing Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488–89 (1972)).
70 See, e.g., United States v. Orta, 760 F.2d 887, 891 n.20 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc);
United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 765 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Vortis, 785
F.2d 327, 328–29 (D.C. Cir. 1986); United States v. Medina, 775 F.2d 1398, 1402 (11th Cir.
1985); United States v. Gebro, 948 F.2d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1146 (2d Cir. 1986); see also, e.g., United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d
243, 250 (5th Cir. 1985).
71 786 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1985).
72 Id. at 765.
73 760 F.2d 887 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
74 Id. at 891 n.20.
75 Medina, 775 F.2d at 1402.
68
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have continued to rely on these dated cases without meaningful
reconsideration.76
But even if the courts are correct that Congress has spoken
to this issue (albeit through silence), “countervailing constitutional constraints” set a floor on the permissible standard of
proof.77 When a person’s physical liberty is at stake, the Constitution requires a standard more stringent than a preponderance of
the evidence.
II. THE DUE PROCESS ARGUMENT
When Congress fails to prescribe a burden of proof—as in the
case of the pretrial flight-risk standard—it falls to the judiciary
to resolve the issue within the contours of the Constitution.78 The
determination of the appropriate flight-risk standard is of particular constitutional importance given that pretrial detention results in an immediate withdrawal of physical liberty.
“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core
of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”79 And the Due
Process Clause directly circumscribes the quantum of evidence
required to authorize such a deprivation of liberty. The Supreme
Court has elaborated that “in any given proceeding, the minimum
standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error
should be distributed between the litigants.”80
In Mathews v. Eldridge,81 the Supreme Court held that
whether a certain procedure comports with due process depends
on three factors: the affected interest of the private party, the likelihood of an erroneous outcome under the procedural scheme at

76 See, e.g., United States v. Keeton, No. 20-10162, 2020 WL 4805479, at *1 (9th Cir.
June 17, 2020) (citing Motamedi, 767 F.2d at 1406); United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d
63, 75 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Chimurenga, 760 F.2d at 405).
77 Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 95 (1981).
78 Cf. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (explaining in a
securities law case the Court’s role in prescribing the appropriate standard of proof when
both Congress and the Constitution are silent).
79 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).
80 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982).
81 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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issue, and the government’s countervailing interest in maintaining the challenged procedure.82 The Court relies on this framework in challenges to evidentiary standards authorizing
nonpunitive detention.
Applying Mathews to the BRA demonstrates the constitutional infirmity of the preponderance standard for flight risk.83 A
defendant’s interest in avoiding pretrial detention is more significant than analogous contexts in which the Court has required
the use of a clear and convincing evidence standard. In contrast,
the government’s interest in reducing flight risk by maintaining
the preponderance standard is appreciably less compelling than
the government’s interest in securing community safety.
This Part applies the three-part Mathews framework to the
preponderance standard for pretrial flight risk. Section A addresses the “private interest that will be affected”—namely, an
arrestee’s interest in pretrial liberty.84 In particular, by considering the Court’s due process jurisprudence in the civil commitment
context, the Section shows that the importance of an arrestee’s
liberty interest requires a clear and convincing evidence standard. Section B considers the risk of an erroneous deprivation under a preponderance standard. An elevated evidentiary standard
mitigates the possibility of errors intrinsic to the flight-risk assessment. Section C evaluates the government’s countervailing
interests in maintaining the preponderance standard for flight
risk; it concludes that, because the government’s primary interest
in community safety is sufficiently secured by a clear and convincing evidence standard, that standard adequately protects the government’s interest in assuring appearance at trial. Section D
returns to Salerno’s implications for due process analysis as applied to pretrial detention.

82

Id. at 335.
Courts have previously applied the Mathews framework to other aspects of the
BRA. For example, in United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378 (1st Cir. 1985), the First Circuit invoked Mathews to decide whether the presumptions of detention contained in
§ 3142(e) violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 384–87 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
In Salerno, the Supreme Court affirmatively cited Mathews for the proposition that the
BRA must comport with procedural due process. 481 U.S. at 746 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S.
at 335). Relatedly, the Motamedi dissent applied Addington (which in turn relied on
Mathews) to conclude that the BRA requires a clear and convincing standard for flight
risk. Motamedi, 767 F.2d at 1413–14 (Boochever, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)).
84 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
83
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A. The Defendant’s Interest: The Significant Deprivations of
Pretrial Detention
Under the first Mathews factor, an individual’s private interests weigh heavily in determining what process she is constitutionally owed. In applying this factor to forms of government
restraint analogous to pretrial detention, the Supreme Court has
generally concluded that physical restrictions on liberty require
at minimum a clear and convincing evidence standard.
In Addington v. Texas,85 the Supreme Court discussed the appropriate evidentiary standard required by the Due Process
Clause to authorize civil commitment (the involuntary hospitalization of a mentally ill, dangerous person). Like pretrial
detention, civil commitment is a significant curtailment of an individual’s physical liberty but does not involve “state power . . .
exercised in a punitive sense.”86 Applying the Mathews framework
in considering the requisite standard of proof, the Court identified
two central interests of individuals facing civil commitment.
First, “civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant
deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”87 Second, civil commitment “can engender adverse social consequences
to the individual. Whether we label this phenomen[on] ‘stigma’ or
choose to call it something else . . . it can have a very significant
impact.”88
The Addington Court recognized that the choice between evidentiary standards has practical and symbolic consequences:
“The standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the
ultimate decision.”89 It went on to explain that the preponderance
standard appropriately applies to typical civil proceedings given
society’s relatively minimal interest in the outcome of a case involving monetary claims.90 In contrast, due process requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases because the defendant’s liberty interests are so significant that “our society imposes
almost the entire risk of error upon itself.”91 The intermediate
clear and convincing evidence standard applies in

85
86
87
88
89
90
91

441 U.S. 418 (1979).
Id. at 428.
Id. at 425.
Id. at 426.
Id. at 423; see also id. at 426.
Addington, 441 U.S. at 423.
Id. at 424.
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“quasi-criminal” cases in which the “interests at stake . . . are
deemed to be more substantial than mere loss of money.”92 As
such, “the ‘clear and convincing’ standard . . . is required [for civil
commitment] to meet due process guarantees.”93 Foucha v. Louisiana94—applying the same reasoning and balancing of factors—
bolstered this conclusion by holding that “the State must establish insanity and dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence
in order to confine an insane convict beyond his criminal sentence.”95
Courts have relied on this civil-commitment line of cases to
require a clear and convincing evidence standard when one’s
“[f]reedom from imprisonment” is at issue.96 Extending Addington
to the immigration context, for example, lower courts have held
that “the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that continued detention is justified” pending a removal decision.97 In these immigration cases, courts have applied the same
standard to flight-risk assessments despite the fact that immigrants are likely to have substantial foreign ties.98 Importantly,
these courts recognize that, like in Addington, “when someone
stands to lose an interest more substantial than money, we protect that interest by holding the Government to a higher standard
of proof.”99
The foregoing cases illustrate the magnitude of the interests
at stake in pretrial detention. Most relevant is a defendant’s
liberty interest, which remains significant regardless of the particular type or source of restraint.100 The Supreme Court has unambiguously established that the Due Process Clause’s protection
of physical freedom applies broadly to “government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint.”101 And in Salerno,
92

Id.
Id. at 433.
94 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
95 Id. at 86.
96 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
97 Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2011).
98 See id. at 1203 (“[T]he government must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that an alien is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial of bond.”); see
also German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2020)
(applying the Mathews framework).
99 German Santos, 965 F.3d at 213–14.
100 See Siegler & Zunkel, supra note 6, at 51 n.102 (“People have a fundamental liberty interest in not being confined pending trial, and the Fifth Amendment requires that
any deprivation of liberty be attended by robust procedural protections.” (citing Mathews,
424 U.S. at 332)).
101 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
93
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the Court emphasized “the individual’s strong interest in liberty”
prior to trial.102
Pretrial detention engenders consequences beyond the curtailment of one’s physical liberty. Like people who face the stigma
associated with civil commitment, a person detained before trial
will be associated with criminality, regardless of the ultimate outcome of his or her case. Judge Robert Boochever’s Motamedi dissent—applying Mathews in considering the pretrial flight-risk
standard—recognized that pretrial detention “result[s] in permanent stigma and loss of reputation to the defendant.”103 This
stigma accompanies other serious consequences. Pretrial detention can cause detainees to lose their jobs, their housing, and even
their children.104 For example, one study found that those detained prior to trial for just three days had a 76.1% chance of
experiencing disruption in employment and a 37.2% chance of experiencing residential instability.105
The practical consequences of pretrial detention are even
greater than those in the civil commitment context—even if a defendant is ultimately acquitted. First, the duration of pretrial
detention has risen sharply in recent years, resembling indefinite
civil commitment. In 2016, for example, the average pretrial
detention period was 255 days, with several districts averaging
over four hundred days.106 In 2019, the Eastern District of New
York’s average duration of pretrial detention was an alarming
884 days.107 Even so, the increasing length of detention is not a
necessary condition for requiring a heightened evidentiary standard. Courts have recognized that even a relatively short pretrial
detention does not alleviate the constitutional concerns with a

102

Salerno, 481 U.S at 750.
Motamedi, 767 F.2d at 1414 (Boochever, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); cf. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 756 (requiring heightened due process protections when an
individual may suffer stigmatic consequences when detained); Addington, 441 U.S. at 426
(reasoning the same in the civil commitment context).
104 Siegler & Zunkel, supra note 6, at 47 & nn.21–24 (collecting studies).
105 Alexander M. Holsinger & Kristi Holsinger, Analyzing Bond Supervision Survey
Data: The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Self-Reported Outcomes, 82 FED. PROB. 39, 41-42
(2018).
106 Austin, supra note 10, at 53.
107 Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Pretrial Services Detention Summary: Days, Average
and Median for the 12 Month Period Ending September 30, 2019, U.S. CTS. (Sept. 30,
2019), https://perma.cc/646M-WY2Y.
103

2022]

Pretrial Detention by a Preponderance

1261

preponderance standard: “[W]hen a party stands to lose his liberty, even temporarily, we hold the Government to a higher burden of proof.”108
Second, pretrial detention can causally influence the ultimate disposition of the defendant’s criminal case by signaling
dangerousness to decision makers and undermining a defendant’s
ability to participate in crafting a defense. As Professor Stephanie
Didwania has explained, “pretrial detention immediately affects
a defendant’s case, leading to a longer sentence, an increased likelihood of pleading guilty, and a reduced probability of receiving a
sentencing reduction.”109 A pretrial detainee is also more likely to
be convicted of a criminal offense.110 Another study finds that
“[p]retrial detention increases a defendant’s likelihood of conviction by 55%, guilty plea by 46%, and incarceration sentencing by
88%,”111 even when controlling for confounding factors.112 The
causal pathways are numerous. Detention “may inadvertently
signal dangerousness or culpability to court officials who determine guilt.”113 Moreover, detention significantly curtails a defendant’s ability to converse with his or her lawyer, gather evidence,
and devise a trial strategy.114 While detained, defendants are unable to maintain employment or otherwise remain involved in
their communities, factors that bear directly on defendants’ ultimate sentences.115
It is difficult to overstate the implications of these facts on
the Mathews due process determination.116 Unlike civil
108

German Santos, 965 F.3d at 214 (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 741).
Didwania, supra note 5, at 1264.
110 See Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin & Crystal S. Yang, The Effects of Pretrial Detention
on Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned
Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201, 224–26 (2018).
111 Ellen A. Donnelly & John M. MacDonald, The Downstream Effects of Bail and
Pretrial Detention on Racial Disparities in Incarceration, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
775, 805 (2019).
112 Id. at 804; see also Samuel R. Wiseman, Bail and Mass Incarceration, 53 GA. L.
REV. 235, 251–52 (2018) (“All of these studies controlled for factors not associated with
bail that could affect the likelihood of conviction and release, including, for example, race,
age, gender, prior offenses, and number of charged offenses. . . .[Pretrial detention is] a
factor driving the higher conviction rates for pretrial detainees.”).
113 Donnelly & MacDonald, supra note 111, at 789.
114 See id.
115 See id.
116 See generally Stephanie Holmes Didwania, The Immediate Consequences of Federal Pretrial Detention, 22 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 24 (2020) (finding that federal pretrial
release reduces sentence length, increases the probability of receiving a sentence below
the recommended sentencing range, and lessens the probability that a defendant will receive a mandatory minimum sentence); Emily Leslie & Nolan G. Pope, The Unintended
109
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commitment, pretrial detention affects a defendant’s likelihood of
criminal conviction and length of post-conviction imprisonment.
117 Due process protections afforded to defendants at trial are insufficient to remedy the disparities created between those who
are released pretrial and those who are detained.118 At sentencing,
a person detained prior to trial will have a more difficult time
showing, for example, his involvement in the community or ability to maintain employment than someone who was released prior
to trial. The procedural protections at trial cannot retroactively
remedy this dilemma. These conclusions further illustrate that
even if pretrial detention is temporally limited, its consequences
are indefinite.
The first Mathews factor—the affected private interest—
weighs strongly in favor of a heightened evidentiary standard. A
defendant’s interest in avoiding pretrial detention is perhaps
even greater than a person’s interest in avoiding civil commitment. Comparison aside, however, restraints on liberty alone are
often sufficient to require at least a clear and convincing evidence
standard. An arrestee’s interest in avoiding pretrial detention is
substantial and far greater than those at stake in run-of-the-mill
civil litigation.119
B. The High Risk of Erroneous Detention
The second prong of the Mathews framework, which evaluates the risk that a defendant will be erroneously deprived of her
liberty under the challenged procedure, also provides strong support for applying a clear and convincing evidence standard to the
flight-risk determination. Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that “the preponderance standard creates the risk
of increasing the number of individuals erroneously [detained].”120

Impact of Pretrial Detention on Case Outcomes: Evidence from New York City Arraignments, 60 J.L. & ECON. 529 (2017) (showing that pretrial detainment increases the probability of conviction and increases recidivism).
117 See Wiseman, supra note 112, at 245 (emphasizing the “strong empirical evidence”
that “pretrial detention is correlated to both an increased likelihood of conviction and
lengthier average sentences”).
118 See Motamedi, 767 F.2d at 1414 (Boochever, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“[T]he injuries consequent upon pretrial confinement may not be reparable upon
a subsequent acquittal.”).
119 Cf. Addington, 441 U.S. at 424 (concluding that a heightened evidentiary standard
is necessary when the interests at stake are “more substantial than mere loss of money”).
120 Cf. id. at 426 (describing the civil commitment context).
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In the civil-commitment context, the Court recognized that a
preponderance standard would intolerably elevate the risk of mistakenly depriving someone of her liberty. “[A] factfinder might
decide to commit an individual based solely on a few isolated instances of unusual conduct. Loss of liberty calls for a showing that
the individual suffers from something more serious than is
demonstrated by idiosyncratic behavior.”121 Connecting that risk
of erroneous deprivation with the necessary evidentiary standard, the Court continued: “Increasing the burden of proof is one
way to impress the factfinder with the importance of the decision
and thereby perhaps to reduce the chances that inappropriate
commitments will be ordered.”122
By way of contrast, the Supreme Court has upheld a preponderance standard for the continued commitment of defendants
who have been acquitted by reason of insanity. Because insanity
is an affirmative defense, defendants typically stipulate to the
truth of the underlying criminal allegations; defendants also bear
the burden of proving the affirmative defense (often by a preponderance of the evidence). Accordingly, “[a] verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity establishes two facts: (i) the defendant
committed an act that constitutes a criminal offense, and (ii) he
committed the act because of mental illness.”123 Those acquitted
of insanity are then hospitalized on the basis of their mental
health status, which must have been proven under a preponderance standard—not the typical beyond a reasonable doubt standard governing criminal trials. The Court has found that the
hospitalization of insanity acquittees does not significantly increase the risk of an erroneous deprivation despite the fact that
the defendant must establish insanity by only a preponderance of
the evidence. Under this scheme, there is a sort of double protection—first, the government must prove the elements of a crime
beyond a reasonable doubt (although often accomplished through
a defendant’s plea of not guilty by reason of insanity), and second,
the defendant must establish insanity by a preponderance of the
evidence. In these cases, then, the preponderance standard is not
the sole basis for institutionalizing a defendant.124

121
122
123
124

Id. at 427.
Id.
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363–64 (1983).
See generally id.
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This rule owes its origins to Jones v. United States.125 Under
the Washington, D.C., statute at issue, defendants could be acquitted by reason of insanity if insanity was proven by a preponderance of the evidence.126 An acquittal, however, would not mean
that the defendant went free: “If he successfully invokes the
insanity defense, he is committed to a mental hospital.”127 The
statute required periodic hearings to assess the acquitee’s eligibility for release, “at which he [would have] the burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that he [was] no longer mentally ill or dangerous.”128 Michael Jones had pleaded not guilty by
reason of insanity to petit larceny, a misdemeanor with a maximum sentence of one year in prison.129 The government did not
contest the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, and the court
committed Jones to a mental hospital.130
At his second release hearing, which occurred more than a
year after Jones’s commitment, Jones argued that he should be
released automatically because his hospitalization had exceeded
the maximum possible sentence for the underlying crime he
would have otherwise served.131 Jones asserted that his ongoing
detention was unconstitutional under Addington given that “the
judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity did not constitute a
finding of present mental illness and dangerousness [ ] because it
was established only by a preponderance of the evidence.”132
The Court rejected Jones’s due process argument.133 Although
insanity acquittees retain liberty interests similar to those of individuals subject to civil commitment, the risk of erroneous deprivation is limited by the due process protections at trial. Under
the D.C. statute, an insanity-based acquittal establishes that “the
defendant committed an act that constitutes a criminal offense.”134 Unlike in civil commitment proceedings, “[t]he fact that
a person has been found, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have committed a criminal act certainly indicates dangerousness.”135 In
Jones, the Court concluded that this trial determination is more
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

463 U.S. 354 (1983).
Id. at 356.
Id.
Id. at 357.
Id. at 359-60.
Jones, 463 U.S. at 360.
Id.
Id. at 362.
Id. at 367–68.
Id. at 363.
Jones, 463 U.S. at 364.
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protective of a defendant’s due process rights than in a civil commitment proceeding, so a preponderance standard is appropriate
for the commitment of defendants acquitted by reason of insanity.136 The beyond a reasonable doubt standard thus acts as a gatekeeper to reaching the insanity determination—unlike in ordinary cases of civil commitment or pretrial detention.
Unlike in Jones, where the hospitalization occurred after trial
or a plea, in the pretrial detention context subsequent due process
protections at trial do not ameliorate the risk of an erroneous pretrial deprivation of liberty. Several intrinsic features of the BRA
and the flight-risk determination substantially elevate the possibility of an unsound detention under a preponderance standard.
The lower standard affords nearly unbounded leeway for a judge
to evaluate a defendant’s flight risk.
Judges are susceptible to a variety of different decisionmaking errors and biases. First, judges make decisions that reflect intentional risk aversion, creating a de facto presumption of
detention. In particular, judges “retain the incentive to be too cautious releasing people pretrial because some released people will
commit new crimes.”137 Even when there is little evidence of danger, judges may still be unwilling to release a defendant, incentivizing them to turn to the lower preponderance standard to
circumvent the clear and convincing evidence standard for dangerousness. Empirical research shows that judges are hesitant to
release even those with light criminal records.138 Scholars have
attributed this failure to the difficulty of changing court culture,
which illustrates the need for greater procedural limits on pretrial detention.139 The preponderance standard allows judges to
eschew a defendant’s individualized arguments against pretrial
detention, especially given judges’ crushing workloads and severe
time constraints.140
Second, judges often rely on subjective intuitions rather than
concrete evidence when deciding whether to detain a defendant

136

Id.
Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment: The Cautionary Tale of Federal Sentencing, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1125, 1140 (2018).
138 See Brandon L. Garrett, Federal Criminal Risk Assessment, 41 CARDOZO L. REV.
121, 130–31 (2019).
139 See, e.g., Thomas H. Cohen & Amaryllis Austin, Examining Federal Pretrial Release Trends over the Last Decade, 82 FED. PROB. 3, 12 (2018).
140 See Brandon L. Garrett & John Monahan, Judging Risk, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 439,
482 (2020).
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based on a flight risk.141 Those subjective intuitions are not racially neutral. Instead, “detention decisions are susceptible to
bias, and the results are consistent with stereotyping that particularly harms minority men.”142 The preponderance standard allows different judges to come to vastly different conclusions about
a defendant’s flight risk, all else equal. Even individual judges
vary in their own conclusions between similarly situated defendants.143 A clear and convincing evidence standard would go some
way toward ameliorating this risk, as a finding that a defendant
poses a flight risk would need to be an individualized assessment
“that an arrestee presents an identified and articulable” risk of
nonappearance, much like the current dangerousness standard.144
The rise of quantitative risk-assessment tools amplifies rather than mitigates the pervasive systemic bias in pretrial detention decisions. Such tools frequently reflect racially disparate
assumptions about the risks posed by certain defendants.145 Moreover, risk-assessment tools may solidify the general trend toward
risk aversion because of the inability of these measures to consider a court’s capacity to impose conditions of release that minimize the flight risk.146 Many of these tools also fail to disaggregate
the flight-risk inquiry from the dangerousness inquiry.147
A preponderance standard, then, allows judges utilizing riskassessment tools to bypass the clear and convincing evidence
standard for dangerousness by relying on an aggregate measure
of risk that fails to distinguish between dangerousness and flight
risk. Notably, pretrial risk-assessment tools are rarely binding on
judges.148 The misaligned incentives of judges discussed above
therefore allow judges to protect themselves with risk-assessment
tools when the measures favor detention but ignore them when
those tools favor release—“colloquially, it’s a ‘covering your ass’
problem.”149 A clear and convincing evidence standard would help
address this issue by requiring each judge to find an “identified
141 See Lauryn P. Gouldin, Reforming Pretrial Decision-Making, 55 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 857, 867 (2020); cf. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 762 (“[N]umerous factors combine to magnify the risk of erroneous factfinding . . . [including] imprecise substantive standards that
leave determinations unusually open to the subjective values of the judge.”).
142 Didwania, supra note 5, at 1315.
143 Gouldin, supra note 141, at 867.
144 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751.
145 See Note, supra note 137, at 1132.
146 See Gouldin, supra note 141, at 902–03.
147 Id. at 895–96.
148 See Note, supra note 137, at 1140–41.
149 Id. at 1140.
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and articulable”150 risk that often cannot be reflected in mere
percentages.
A third issue with the current detention hearing procedures
is that “[j]udges are vested with almost unreviewable discretion
in making pretrial release decisions, and they are not otherwise
held accountable for over detention or for over management of
risk when it occurs.”151 As a consequence, not only are defendants
practically unable to seek review and recourse for questionable
detention decisions, but judges’ risk aversion and biases become
normalized and entrenched.
Still other aspects of the pretrial flight-risk assessment create the possibility for unjustified detentions. When parties to a
proceeding are indigent or belong to minority groups, “such proceedings are often vulnerable to judgments based on cultural or
class bias.”152 Moreover, the detention hearing procedures and the
preferences of particular judges are “likely much better known to
government representatives than to detainees,” creating the risk
that prosecutors can rely on the idiosyncrasies of individual
judges to obtain detention of an arrestee.153 Further, it is difficult
to introduce evidence of a negative—it is far easier for the government to produce cause for concern than it is for an arrestee to
produce evidence negating flight risk.154
Further, erroneous detentions reduce the ability of the rest of
the criminal process to comport with procedural due process. As
discussed in the preceding Section, pretrial detention decisions
can affect the disposition of a defendant’s ultimate criminal case.
Because detention hinders defendants’ ability to meet with lawyers, gather exculpatory evidence, prepare for trial, maintain employment, and demonstrate ties to the community, “pre-trial
detention may increase the risk of wrongful convictions and
wrongful case outcomes, such as receiving a more severe sanction
than warranted on the basis of the evidence.”155 Additionally,
pretrial detention “may increase the incentive for defendants to
plead guilty to additional time in prison simply so that they can
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Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751.
Gouldin, supra note 141, at 868.
152 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 763.
153 Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 31 (1st Cir. 2021).
154 See id. (“[P]roving a negative . . . can often be more difficult than proving a cause
for concern.”).
155 Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399,
1421 (2017).
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be freed.”156 By causing erroneous pretrial detentions, a low standard for flight risk may directly cause erroneous convictions and
case outcomes, magnifying the gravity of this Mathews factor.
These issues remain despite the other due process protections
contained in the BRA.157 Where, as here, the private interests at
stake are considerable, “the social cost of even occasional error is
sizable.”158 Notably, the Supreme Court has continued to require
a clear and convincing evidence standard for civil commitment
even in the presence of other robust procedural protections.159 The
risk of erroneous pretrial detention decisions—and corresponding
convictions, sentences, and plea bargains—is considerable and
warrants a clear and convincing evidence standard.
C. The Government’s Limited Interest in Maintaining the
Preponderance Standard
The government’s interest in reducing flight risk counterbalances a defendant’s interest in a heightened standard. The government’s interest is not in preventing danger or securing
community safety, unlike in civil commitment—those goals
should be accomplished through the dangerousness inquiry.160 In
addition, “the [BRA’s] language referring to the safety of the community refers to the danger that the defendant might engage in
criminal activity to the detriment of the community,”161 not just
in violent criminal activity. Congress intended “the concern about
safety [to] be given a broader construction than merely danger of
harm involving physical violence.”162 As a consequence, the dangerousness prong—not the flight-risk prong—is meant to protect
the government’s interest in preventing recidivism, violent and
nonviolent alike.
156

Id. at 1419.
Recent empirical work has questioned the efficacy of these protections. See, e.g.,
Siegler & Zunkel, supra note 6, at 46–48.
158 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 764.
159 For example, the statute at issue in Santosky granted indigent parents, among
other things, the right to an attorney, adequate notice, and appeal. See id. at 777–80
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (outlining the several due process protections codified in the
statute at issue).
160 See generally Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness,
2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. 837 (2016) (arguing that flight risk and danger must be analyzed
independently under the BRA).
161 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 12.
162 Id.; see also United States v. Madoff, 586 F. Supp. 2d 240, 251–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(finding that the dangerousness inquiry encompasses economic harm); United States v.
Reynolds, 956 F.2d 192, 192–93 (9th Cir. 1992) (same).
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The government has a stronger interest in preventing a defendant’s flight if the defendant is likely to commit further crimes.
But because Congress set the standard for detention based on
dangerousness at clear and convincing evidence, it would be a
mistake to conclude that the government’s interest in preventing
flight because of the potential for recidivism warrants only a preponderance standard. Right off the bat, then, the government’s
strongest interest in pretrial detention is not pertinent here.
Instead, the government’s interest in preventing flight is
largely cabined to administrative and enforcement costs.163 But
those interests are relatively trivial. And the Supreme Court is
skeptical of the administrative-costs justification for less stringent procedural protections: “[T]he Constitution recognizes
higher values than speed and efficiency. . . .[T]he Bill of Rights in
general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, . . . were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from
the overbearing concern for efficiency.”164 In the pretrial detention
context, these administrative burdens are “shorter-term,” and defendants who abscond are “not likely to evade justice permanently.”165 Empirical research also demonstrates that defendants
are exceedingly likely to appear for court and that other solutions
are highly effective in securing appearance.166 Even when contrasting jurisdictions with high and low release rates, released
federal defendants fail to appear in court only around 1% of the
time.167 “In the information age, it is difficult for a person to completely abscond, and interventions as simple as text-messaging
reminders have proven effective in reducing failures to appear.”168
Notably, although “[a]ssuming that offense seriousness correlates

163 See Gouldin, supra note 59, at 734 (“[N]onappearances trigger nuisance costs.
These include the administrative costs of rescheduling court dates. . . .[T]he government
may also incur some expense locating and rearresting defendants.”).
164 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
165 Gouldin, supra note 59, at 732.
166 Id.
167 Siegler & Zunkel, supra note 6, at 47 fig.1; id. (“In 2019, 99 percent of released
federal defendants nationwide appeared for court as required. . . .What is really
remarkable is that this near-perfect compliance rate is seen equally in federal districts
with very high release rates and those with very low release rates.”).
168 Didwania, supra note 5, at 1319; see also Gouldin, supra note 59, at 727; John
Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk Assessment and the Future of
Bail Reform, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1725, 1765 (2018) (“Small changes in the administration of
bail can have a substantial impact on failure to appear rates in a jurisdiction. Many of
these reforms are relatively low-cost and low-tech, such as text message reminders about
upcoming court dates.”).
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to flight risk has intuitive appeal, [ ] decades of bail studies challenge that claim.”169 In fact, “defendants charged with more serious offenses . . . do not, in fact, fail to appear at higher rates.”170
One might suppose that, administrative costs aside,
nonappearances undermine the government’s strong interest in
maintaining the integrity of the criminal system. The low rates of
nonappearance, however, show that this concern is also minimal.
For example, “technology and improved interjurisdictional coordination have diminished the prospect of successful flight.”171 Reducing pretrial detention might also improve the integrity of the
judicial system. A preponderance standard suggests that “society
has a minimal concern with the outcome” of the proceeding despite the harms that accrue from pretrial detention.172 Pretrial
detention “damages the credibility of the entire system. Our communities come to see courts not as places of justice, where
evidence is carefully weighed.”173 Instead, pretrial detention hearings become “places where poor people are abused.”174
Even to the extent that meaningful nonappearance costs exist, such concerns are mitigated by the fact that pretrial detention
is on average ten times more expensive than supervised release.175
The benefits of expanding pretrial release might compensate for
any nonappearance costs. What’s more, pretrial detention in one
case may increase the risk of future nonappearances in other
cases,176 suggesting that a heightened evidentiary standard might
actually be more protective of the government’s interest than the
status quo.177 In any case, even a charitable reading reveals that
the government’s interests are minimal when compared to the
risks of erroneous jailing, social stigma, loss of employment and
housing, wrongful conviction, and skewed sentencing.
169

Gouldin, supra note 59, at 705.
Id.
171 Id. at 727.
172 Addington, 441 U.S. at 424.
173 John Raphling, Efficient Injustice: Too Much Pretrial Incarceration Damages the
Integrity of Our Courts, 57 JUDGES’ J. 14, 17 (2018).
174 Id.
175 See Austin, supra note 10, at 53.
176 Gouldin, supra note 141, at 873 (“[E]ven brief jail stays undermine other system
goals by increasing the likelihood of future nonappearance and future offending.”); see also
Yang, supra note 155, at 1426 (“[D]efendants who are detained before trial are over ten
percentage points more likely to be rearrested for a new crime up to two years after the
initial arrest.”).
177 Nor would there be appreciable administrative costs related to the detention hearings themselves. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767 (“Nor would an elevated standard of
proof create any real administrative burdens for the State’s factfinders.”).
170
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The “[Supreme] Court has mandated an intermediate
standard of proof—‘clear and convincing evidence’—when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both ‘particularly important’ and ‘more substantial than mere loss of
money.’” 178 While the defendant’s interests in avoiding pretrial
detention are far greater than the mere loss of money, the government’s interests are largely pecuniary. It is also not clear that the
government’s interests are better protected by a preponderance
standard, as pretrial detention is more expensive than conditions
of release and may increase the risk of future nonappearance. The
government’s interests, including administrative costs, are sufficiently protected under a clear and convincing evidence standard.
D. Salerno’s Implications for Due Process
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Salerno, which upheld the
government’s authority to seek pretrial detention for dangerous
defendants, supports the position that flight risk requires a clear
and convincing evidence standard. Although the Salerno Court
was not confronted with the question of the requisite evidentiary
standard for flight risk,179 the BRA’s clear and convincing evidence standard for dangerousness “was one of the reasons that
the Salerno Court specifically cited for upholding the constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act.”180
Since Salerno, many procedural due process protections—
such as the Speedy Trial Act’s181 limitation on the duration of
detention and the § 3142(f) factors as gatekeepers to capricious
detention—have eroded. Pretrial detention is no longer a “carefully limited exception”182—it has instead become the rule.183 Consider Salerno’s reliance on “stringent time limitations” on pretrial

178

Id. at 756 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 424).
See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 (“The fact that the Bail Reform Act might operate
unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it
wholly invalid.”).
180 Gouldin, supra note 160, at 837; see also Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751 (“When the Government proves by clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee presents an identified
and articulable threat to an individual or the community, we believe that, consistent with
the Due Process Clause, a court may disable the arrestee from executing that threat.”).
181 Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (1975) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3161–3174).
182 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755.
183 See Siegler & Harris, supra note 7; Siegler & Zunkel, supra note 6, at 46; Yang,
supra note 155, at 1401.
179
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detention.184 As illuminated in Part II.A, the length of pretrial detention has become incredibly protracted, with some districts averaging more than two years. Another limit that has weakened in
recent years is the § 3142(f) gatekeeper, which authorizes a judge
to move from an initial appearance to a detention hearing in only
limited circumstances.185 Research has shown that the § 3142(f)
factors, which are supposed to cabin pretrial detention to the most
serious cases, are no longer an effective limit on pretrial detention. One study found that 10% of detentions did not satisfy a
§ 3142(f) prerequisite, “rendering the resulting detention illegal.”186 Thus, the due process protections that animated the
Court’s decision in Salerno have largely dissipated. Scholars have
warned that “the law as it operates in practice has become untethered from the law as written in the statute.”187 The erosion of
the due process protections that were more effective at the time
of Salerno makes elevating the evidentiary standard for flight
risk crucial; retaining a preponderance standard exposes arrestees to serious liberty deprivations without adequate protection.
That said, even if the other procedural protections in the BRA
were robust, the Mathews factors would still require a clear and
convincing evidence standard. An arrestee’s interest in pretrial
liberty is considerable, especially given the downstream consequences that amass from incarceration prior to a finding of guilt.
The flight-risk assessment in general—and the preponderance
standard in particular—entail an intolerable likelihood of an erroneous detention. Especially because the government’s interest
is in avoiding largely speculative costs, maintaining the preponderance standard will continue to burden defendants’ liberty interests in a manner irreconcilable with due process under
Mathews.
III. THE INTERPRETIVE ARGUMENT
The previous Part showed why the preponderance standard
for pretrial flight risk is unconstitutional. The courts’ adoption of
this unconstitutional standard is even less defensible when one
considers the interpretive justifications for a clear and convincing

184
185
186
187

Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
Siegler & Zunkel, supra note 6, at 48.
Id. at 46.
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evidence threshold. The statutory construction question addressed by this Comment arises not from an ambiguous word or
phrase but from the absence of statutory language altogether.
Section 3142(f) sets forth the procedures for a detention hearing
that govern a judge’s determination of a defendant’s dangerousness or flight risk. But the detention hearing procedures in
§ 3142(f) specify an evidentiary standard only for proving dangerousness—not flight risk.
The endeavor here, then, is not to ascertain the meaning of a
particular statutory provision but to fill the gap left by Congress.188 The assumption made by the Motamedi court that “Congress acts with deliberation, rather than by inadvertence, when
it drafts a statute” is inapposite.189 The text of § 3142(f) suggests
that Congress did not act deliberately; if it had, it would have
drafted an explicit evidentiary standard for flight risk instead of
trusting courts to divine congressional intent from its silence. But
regardless of whether Congress’s omission of a flight-risk standard was intentional or inadvertent, the statute is ambiguous,
which requires an analysis of the context surrounding the BRA’s
enactment to resolve this issue.
This Part begins by explaining that Congress in all likelihood
intended flight risk to be governed by a clear and convincing evidence standard. In particular, Section A addresses the BRA’s legislative history, which indicates that Congress intended flight
risk and danger to be considered under equivalent evidentiary
standards. Section B examines the statutory evolution of the
BRA, illustrating that Congress was primarily concerned with
dangerousness when amending the BRA in 1984. Consequently,
it is illogical to infer that Congress intended for a lower evidentiary standard to govern flight risk. Section C clarifies the pre1984 pretrial detention standard. Specifically, flight risk under
the 1966 BRA was governed by an evidentiary standard more
stringent than a preponderance of the evidence. Congress’s silence, therefore, can be read as an intent to incorporate the
heightened pre-1984 standard. Section D responds to the structuralist counterargument that, because Congress specified a clear
and convincing evidence standard for both flight risk and dangerousness in § 3143, its silence in § 3142(f) espouses an intent to
differentiate the pretrial flight-risk standard from the pretrial
188 See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (“Where Congress
has not prescribed the appropriate standard of proof . . . we must prescribe one.”).
189 Motamedi, 767 F.2d at 1406.
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danger standard. Section E concludes by making the constitutional avoidance argument for a clear and convincing evidence
standard. The best interpretation of the BRA is that flight risk
must be governed by clear and convincing evidence, but because
of the serious constitutional arguments discussed in Part II, that
interpretation need not be the most straightforward reading of
the statute.
A. Flight Risk in the BRA’s Legislative History
Though the BRA’s legislative history addresses dangerousness almost exclusively, it also shows that Congress intended for
dangerousness and flight risk to be governed by equivalent evidentiary standards.
Considering legislative history in this context is uniquely appropriate and necessary. First, when a statute fails to specify an
evidentiary standard, the Supreme Court has recognized the importance of the statute’s legislative history.190 Indeed, legislative
history is particularly instructive when the statutory text is silent.191 In most cases, “the authoritative statement is the statutory text,”192 but here, legislative history does not supplant clear
(or even ambiguous) statutory text. Accordingly, “[t]he proper
method of determining whether Congress intended two different
standards . . . is to look at the legislative history.”193 Second, the
Supreme Court has considered legislative history when construing the BRA specifically,194 and the circuits have followed its
lead.195 Third, unlike in many cases, the BRA’s legislative history

190 See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (beginning the analysis of the burden of proof issue with a discussion of legislative history).
191 See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1749 (2020) (noting that legislative history is useful primarily when meaning of statutory text is not plain); Gundy v.
United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2126 (2019) (supporting the use of legislative history when
the text is unclear).
192 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005).
193 Motamedi, 767 F.2d at 1411 (Boochever, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
194 See, e.g., Salerno, 481 U.S at 747.
195 See, e.g., Orta, 760 F.2d at 890 (evaluating the BRA’s legislative history when construing the phrase “reasonably assure”); United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d at 243, 251 (5th
Cir. 1985) (considering the BRA’s legislative history in interpreting the § 3142(e) presumptions of detention); United States v. Himler, 797 F.2d 156, 160 (3d. Cir. 1986) (relying on
legislative history in applying § 3142(f)); United States v. Dillard, 214 F.3d 88, 95 (2d. Cir.
2000) (“Because the meaning of the [BRA] on this point is open to dispute, we look for
further guidance to legislative history.”).
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is not contradictory or murky, making it a useful interpretive
aid.196
The BRA’s legislative history indicates that Congress intended both danger and flight risk to be assessed under a clear
and convincing evidence standard. The primary House Report declares that flight risk should be subject to the same evidentiary
standard as dangerousness: “[T]he burden of establishing that a
defendant is dangerous [or] a flight risk is on the prosecution.
This burden can be met only by the submission of clear and convincing evidence to the court.”197 The main Senate Report also expresses a clear intent to treat flight risk and danger equivalently:
the “provisions of [S]ection 3142[ ] place[ ] the consideration of defendant dangerousness on an equal footing with the consideration
of appearance.”198 The Report further establishes that “the danger
a defendant may pose to others should receive at least as much
consideration in the pretrial release determination as the likelihood that he will not appear for trial.”199
Although the Senate Report is silent as to the evidentiary
standard for flight-risk determinations, it does express its purpose in applying a clear and convincing standard to dangerousness: “Because of the importance of the interests of the defendant
which are implicated in a pretrial detention hearing, . . . the facts
on which the judicial officer bases a finding [of dangerousness] . . .
must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.”200 The

196 Cf. Allapattah, 545 U.S. at 568 (criticizing the application of legislative history
when it is “murky, ambiguous, and contradictory”).
197 H.R. REP. NO. 98-1121, at 27 (1984). The original quote from this Report says that
“the burden of establishing that a defendant is dangerous on a flight risk is on the prosecution.” Id. (emphasis added). Other scholarship has treated this as a typographical error.
See Robert S. Natalini, Comment, Preventive Detention and Presuming Dangerousness
Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 225, 233 (1985) (correcting “on” to
“or” when quoting this sentence from the legislative record). The phrase “dangerous on a
flight risk” makes little practical sense and does not appear anywhere else in the Report.
The paragraph is generally about how the 1984 BRA “not only codifies existing authority
to detain persons who are serious flight risks . . . but also creates new authority to detain
persons who pose especially serious dangers.” H.R. REP. NO. 98-1121, at 27.
Further, no other piece of legislative history—nor any other case or article—uses the
phrase “dangerous on a flight risk.” But cases and scholarship do use the phrase “dangerous or a flight risk.” See, e.g., United States v. Hammond, 44 F. Supp. 2d 743, 746 (D. Md.
1999); Timothy E. Eidle, “Goodbye Guadalupe”: United States v. Montalvo-Murillo and
the Struggle to Construct a Remedy for an Untimely Pretrial Detention Hearing Under the
Bail Reform Act of 1984, 17 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 451, 475 (1991).
198 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 12 (emphasis added).
199 Id. at 6.
200 Id. at 22.
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Report further emphasizes “the importance of the defendant’s interest in remaining at liberty prior to trial.”201 Even the Department of Justice recognized the constitutional justification for a
clear and convincing evidence standard. As Deputy Attorney General James Knapp testified before the House Judiciary Committee, “[W]e require clear and convincing evidence [and] . . . something tangible in a particular case” given the difficulties in
predicting a defendant’s future behavior.202 Congress’s rationale
for imposing a clear and convincing standard is based on a foundational constitutional protection of liberty, an interest that is not
unique to the community safety context. This liberty interest—
remaining free prior to trial—applies with equal force to defendants detained as flight risks.
B. Dangerousness: Congress’s Predominant Concern
The fact that the legislative history pertains almost entirely
to dangerousness further suggests that the flight-risk standard
was intended to be clear and convincing evidence. It would be illogical to conclude that Congress, which was concerned primarily
with addressing the dangerousness of pretrial releasees, was satisfied with a clear and convincing evidence standard for danger
but desired a constitutionally dubious standard for flight.
To understand why the legislative history primarily addresses the dangerousness provisions of the BRA, it is helpful to
understand the statutory evolution of bail reform from 1966 to
1984. Under the 1966 BRA, judges were barred from considering
community safety and defendants’ dangerousness when deciding
whether to release someone on bail.203 Nevertheless, Congress
passed a 1970 statute for Washington, D.C., allowing pretrial detention to secure community safety.204 The 1984 BRA built on the
D.C. statute, radically altering the federal pretrial detention process by authorizing judges to consider defendants’ risk to the community.205 The 1984 BRA sought to address the “[c]onsiderable
criticism [that] ha[d] been leveled at the Bail Reform Act [of 1966]

201

Id. at 7.
Bail Reform Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on Judiciary, 98th Cong. 233 (1984) (statement
of James Knapp, Deputy Att’y Gen. of the United States); see also Administration of Bail,
supra note 48, at 18 (noting Knapp’s comments).
203 S. REP. NO. 98-147, at 32 (1983).
204 D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322 (1970) (amended 2017).
205 See Maier, supra note 20, at 1433.
202
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. . . because of its failure to recognize the problem of crimes committed by those on pretrial release.”206 In sum, the fact that the
legislative history “pertains almost exclusively to the dangerousness provisions . . . is unsurprising since the dangerousness provisions were a radical and controversial change in the law.”207
This statutory evolution explains the general sentiment pervading the legislative history that “[t]he question of whether
dangerousness should be a sufficient justification for pretrial detention is the single most difficult bail issue.”208 The Senate Report, discussing the clear and convincing evidence standard for
dangerousness, similarly clarifies that “[w]here there is a strong
probability that a person will commit additional crimes if released, the need to protect the community becomes sufficiently
compelling that detention is, on balance, appropriate.”209 As another Senate Report notes, the 1984 BRA was intended almost
entirely to “address such problems as [ ] the need to consider community safety.”210
The legislature’s overriding concern with community safety
corroborates that the clear and convincing evidence standard was
also intended to govern flight-risk determinations. Congress, despite a near exclusive concern with community safety, nevertheless imposed on the prosecution an elevated standard to prove
that a defendant is sufficiently dangerous to warrant pretrial detention. It is highly improbable that Congress would have intended a less stringent standard where the government interest
was less significant than community safety—especially because
the liberty interests recognized by Congress apply equally to defendants detained as flight risks. The legislative history inarguably shows that Congress viewed community safety as the most
important goal of the 1984 BRA. The legislative history at no
point suggests that flight risk was a weightier interest that demanded a lower burden of proof to protect it.
The fact that Congress was predominantly concerned with
danger undermines the conclusion reached by several circuits
that the BRA’s omission of a flight-risk standard was deliberate.
There are several reasons not to give such undue weight to the

206
207

S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 5.
Motamedi, 767 F.2d at 1411 (Boochever, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
208
209
210

H.R. REP. NO. 98-1121, at 11.
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 7.
S. REP. NO. 98-147, at 1.
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BRA’s silence here. First, it is entirely plausible that Congress
overlooked this or failed to correct its imprecise drafting. Pretrial
detainees are a paradigmatic example of a group underrepresented in the political process and thus unable to effectively
advocate for their interests. Criminal defendants are “politically
unpopular,” “usually poor, disproportionately ethnic minorities,”
and “a small and scattered portion of the population, which makes
it hard for them to be an effective interest group.”211 This political
imbalance makes it unlikely that “errors and accidents of drafting
are caught and corrected.”212 Even if someone recognized that the
statute failed to specify an evidentiary standard for flight risk,
someone had to “care enough about the problem to spend political
capital fixing it[ ] and have political capital to spend.”213 The text
and structure of the BRA itself suggests that Congress was imprecise when drafting its provisions.214 It is therefore plausible—
if not likely—that the failure to prescribe a flight-risk standard
was an oversight rather than the result of rigorous contemplation, especially given Congress’s narrow focus on dangerousness
in drafting the BRA.
Second, even if Congress’s silence was deliberate, one could
plausibly infer given the statutory evolution from the 1966 BRA
to the 1984 BRA that Congress applied an explicit clear and convincing evidence standard to dangerousness for emphasis rather
than to differentiate flight risk from dangerousness.215 Congress
may have feared that, in the absence of an explicit standard,
courts would assume that the overwhelming emphasis on community safety implied a lower evidentiary threshold.
In addition, the legislature would not have intended to provide a loophole for courts and prosecutors to circumvent the

211 Joshua Kleinfeld, Textual Rules in Criminal Statutes, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 1791,
1800–01 (2021).
212 Id. at 1800.
213 Id. at 1802.
214 As Professors Alison Siegler and Erica Zunkel have articulated, the BRA is “badly
organized, difficult to follow, and does not proceed in a logical order. . . .[T]he relevant
provision comes in the middle of the statute—in subsection (f)—rather than towards the
beginning.” Siegler, supra note 48, at 9. Moreover, “one part of § 3142(f) discusses the legal
standard for the Initial Appearance hearing, while another part lists the standards and
procedures for the Detention Hearing.” Id.
215 See Motamedi, 767 F.2d at 1411 (Boochever, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“Another possible inference, however, is that the two standards are the same but
that Congress believed it necessary to state explicitly the standard for the new dangerousness provision, because the clear and convincing evidence standard for the flight risk determination would carry over from prior law.”).
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heightened standard for proving dangerousness by allowing
judges to detain defendants as flight risks. Evidence of dangerousness and evidence of flight risk often overlap. In fact, the BRA
instructs judges to consider identical factors in both the dangerousness and flight-risk evaluations.216 Consequently, the preponderance standard for flight can (and does) render ineffective the
clear and convincing evidence safeguard applied to allegedly dangerous defendants. Even if evidence of dangerousness is insufficient to surpass the clear and convincing evidence threshold, that
same evidence may be enough to satisfy the preponderance standard for flight risk. That allows judges to circumvent an important
procedural safeguard, especially because “judges can be expected
to take advantage of loopholes in pretrial procedures. . . .[J]udges
and prosecutors retain the incentive to be too cautious releasing
people pretrial because some released people will commit new
crimes.”217 Congress’s overriding concern with dangerousness in
enacting the 1984 BRA shows that Congress did not intend a preponderance standard for flight risk. Congress protected its central goal—community safety—under a clear and convincing
evidence standard. It is illogical to infer that Congress would have
authorized a standard more likely to impinge on defendants’
strong liberty interests without an even weightier countervailing
governmental interest.
C. The Pre-1984 Pretrial Detention Standard
According to some courts, Congress’s silence pertaining to the
flight-risk burden of proof evinces an intent to apply the standard
that governs other pretrial proceedings: a preponderance of the
evidence.218 This position overlooks the most relevant Supreme
Court precedent and misreads the pre-1984 standard.
For one, the Supreme Court—in the year preceding the enactment of the 1984 BRA—announced, “[W]e have required proof
by clear and convincing evidence where particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake.”219 As discussed in
Part II.A, the Court recognized that restraints on physical liberty,
such as involuntary commitment proceedings and deportation
cases, fall into this category.220 The precedential backdrop against
216
217
218
219
220

See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
Note, supra note 137, at 1140.
See, e.g., Motamedi, 767 F.2d at 1407; Orta, 760 F.2d at 891 n.20.
Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 389.
See id. (collecting cases).
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which the BRA was drafted thus shows that a clear and convincing evidence standard was required in cases where physical liberty was at stake.
Second, although no cases directly address the requisite evidentiary standard for detention based on flight under the 1966
BRA, a close analysis of cases between 1966 and 1984 shows that
courts were applying a more stringent standard than a preponderance of the evidence. The First Circuit, for example, explained,
“Only in the rarest of circumstances can bail be denied altogether.”221 The court applied that principle in United States v.
Abrahams.222 There, the defendant was “an escaped felon” who
“did not hesitate to flee to Florida and forfeit $100,000 to avoid
the removal hearing.”223 This overwhelming evidence of flight led
the First Circuit to conclude that “[t]his is the rare case of extreme
and unusual circumstances that justifies pretrial detention without bail.”224 The Second Circuit similarly recognized that pretrial
bail was required in all but “extreme and unusual circumstances.”225 In United States v. Leisure,226 the Eighth Circuit took
a parallel approach. The court reversed an order denying bail despite the “very serious and extremely violent crimes” allegedly
committed by the defendants.227 The Court held that “[d]enial of
pretrial [release] . . . must [ ] be limited to the exceptional case.”228
In the related context of bail pending appeal, the Supreme Court
construed § 3148 of the 1966 BRA to require “substantial evidence” that an appellant is a flight risk to order detention.229 The
Sixth Circuit extended that standard to pretrial detention in
United States v. Graewe,230 where it held that there must be “substantial evidence” to deny pretrial bail.231
Finally, the reliance on the preponderance standard for other
pretrial proceedings is inapposite to pretrial detention; these
other proceedings “concern the admissibility of evidence at trial,

221 United States v. Schiavo, 587 F.2d 532, 533 (1st Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (citation
omitted).
222 575 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1978).
223 Id. at 8.
224 Id.
225 Gavino v. MacMahon, 499 F.2d 1191, 1195 (2d Cir. 1974).
226 710 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1983).
227 Id. at 426.
228 Id.
229 Harris v. United States, 404 U.S. 1232, 1235–36 (1971).
230 689 F.2d 54 (6th Cir. 1982).
231 Id. at 58.
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not an immediate deprivation of the defendant’s liberty.”232 Although the admissibility of evidence may later influence the
disposition of a criminal case, these pretrial proceedings are attenuated from the ultimate deprivation of liberty—unlike detention hearings. Consequently, it is likely that the 1966 BRA
required a more stringent standard than a preponderance for pretrial detention.
D. The Relationship and Differences Between Pretrial and
Post-Conviction Detention
Several courts established a preponderance standard for
proving pretrial flight in part because in an adjacent statutory
provision (§ 3143(a), governing post-conviction bail pending sentencing or appeal), “Congress expressly required the defendant to
negate both danger to the community and flight risk by clear and
convincing evidence.”233 A closer examination of the BRA’s legislative history and statutory evolution exposes the infirmity of this
argument.
First, pretrial and post-conviction detention implicate
separate constitutional and societal interests. The general presumption of pretrial release under § 3142 is inverted in the postconviction context under § 3143. That is, the BRA’s pretrial
detention provisions create a “presumption of release for most offenses.”234 But in the post-conviction context, a defendant “shall”
be detained “unless the judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger.”235 This difference is explained by Congress’s expressed
constitutional concerns with detaining a presumptively innocent
person prior to trial—concerns that are no longer relevant once a
defendant has been convicted.236
Second, the statutory history of the BRA undermines the notion that Congress intended to treat flight risk differently in the
pretrial and post-conviction contexts. Congress relied closely on
232 Motamedi, 767 F.2d at 1410 (Boochever, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177–78 (1974); Lego v. Twomey, 404
U.S. 477, 488–89 (1972)). Matlock concerned the voluntariness of a consent search as it
relates to the admissibility of evidence. 415 U.S. at 177. Lego similarly applied a preponderance standard to the admissibility of a potentially coerced confession. 404 U.S. at 489.
233 Motamedi, 767 F.2d at 1406; see also United States v. Vortis, 785 F.2d 327, 328
(D.C. Cir. 1986); 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a).
234 Siegler & Zunkel, supra note 6, at 50.
235 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) (emphasis added).
236 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 7, 22.
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the 1966 BRA in drafting the 1984 provisions on post-conviction
release, but it significantly departed from the 1966 pretrial
framework when drafting the 1984 provisions by adding a new
consideration—dangerousness.
The pretrial provisions of the 1966 BRA did not allow a consideration of dangerousness. Congress fundamentally altered the
purpose of pretrial detention when drafting the pretrial provisions of the 1984 BRA by adding dangerousness as an entirely
new consideration. But in the post-conviction provisions, the 1966
BRA allowed judges to consider both “risk of flight [and] danger.”237 In amending the post-conviction provisions in the 1984
BRA, Congress relied primarily on the preexisting statutory
framework without adding to, or subtracting from, the relevant
considerations—flight risk and dangerousness. Congress, in enacting the 1984 BRA, may not have meaningfully contemplated
the difference between § 3142(f) (pretrial) and § 3143(a) (postconviction), because the language in § 3143(a) considering both
flight risk and dangerousness was already present in the 1966
statute. Congress devoted all of its attention to whether and how
the 1984 BRA should address pretrial dangerousness.
Third, the legislative history shows that the underlying justifications authorizing pretrial and post-conviction detention are
different. As the Senate Report explains, the justifications for pretrial detention are not based on the common punitive theories of
deterrence or retribution.238 Conversely, deterrence does animate
the BRA’s presumption of detention in the post-conviction context.239 Courts drew inferences from the textual differences between the pretrial and post-conviction provisions of the BRA—but
they compared apples to oranges. Congress recognized that pretrial and posttrial detention serve different purposes, which
blunts the inferences that can be drawn from the textual differences between § 3142(f) and § 3143(a).
The fact that the BRA sets a clear and convincing evidence
standard for post-conviction flight risk does not mean that
Congress intended a preponderance standard for pretrial flight
risk. The differences in language may be attributable to substantive differences in the operation and underlying justifications of

237

Bail Reform Act of 1966 § 3148.
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 8 (“[P]retrial detention is not intended to promote the traditional aims of punishment such as retribution or deterrence.”).
239 Id. at 26 (“[R]elease of a criminal defendant into the community after conviction
may undermine the deterrent effect of the criminal law.”).
238
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each provision rather than to congressional intent to create different evidentiary standards.
E. Constitutional Avoidance
The BRA’s legislative history and statutory evolution, as well
as its overall context, demonstrate that the appropriate flightrisk standard is clear and convincing evidence. But even so, the
foregoing interpretive analysis and conclusion are not required to
fully justify that conclusion. An elevated standard is at least a
plausible interpretation of the statute, and it avoids the constitutional criticisms raised in Part II.
1. Constitutional avoidance is especially applicable to the
BRA.
The core premise of the constitutional avoidance canon is that
courts should interpret statutes, when possible, to avoid alternative interpretations that would raise serious constitutional concerns. In the words of Professor Adrian Vermeule, “Avoidance is
perhaps the preeminent canon of federal statutory construction;
its pedigree is so venerable that the Supreme Court invoked a
version of it even before Marbury v. Madison.”240 The Supreme
Court has expressed that it is “obligated to construe [a] statute to
avoid [constitutional] problems”241 and that avoidance is a “cardinal principle” of statutory interpretation.242
The canon has been defended on several grounds, including
as a proxy for legislative intent.243 Some scholars and judges have
also theorized that the avoidance canon “rests [ ] upon a judicial
policy of not interpreting ambiguous statutes to flirt with constitutionality, thereby minimizing judicial conflicts with the legislature.”244 Both justifications have particular relevance to pretrial
detention. The “reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative [interpretation] which raises serious constitutional doubts”245 is even stronger in the context of the BRA
because the statute’s legislative history indicates that Congress
240

Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1948 (1997).
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300 (2001) (emphasis added).
242 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 842 (2018) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
243 See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 382 (2005).
244 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 249 (2012).
245 Clark, 543 U.S. at 381.
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was highly attentive to the constitutional issues raised by pretrial
detention.246 Applying the avoidance canon gives effect to
Congress’s espoused intent that the BRA “be construed as limited
by the constitutional provisions.”247 In contrast, failing to apply
the avoidance canon may precipitate future conflicts between the
judiciary and Congress—conflicts that Congress specifically intended to avert by thoroughly considering relevant constitutional
issues in advance.
2. An alternative interpretation need only be plausible to
trigger avoidance.
The avoidance canon instructs that if there are two
conceivable interpretations of a statute and one would raise serious doubts as to its constitutionality, the court should adopt the
other.248 In cases involving a serious constitutional doubt, courts
are more willing than usual to depart from the most straightforward reading of the text. Indeed, courts have embraced alternative readings so long as they are “fairly possible”249 or
“plausible.”250 As Justice Antonin Scalia opined, “our cases have
been careful to note[ that] the narrowing construction must be
‘fairly possible,’ ‘reasonable,’ or not ‘plainly contrary to the intent
of Congress.’” 251 The Court has been willing to “bend over backwards” to adopt even strained interpretations that avoid constitutional doubts.252
In Bond v. United States,253 for example, the Court interpreted the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of
1998,254 which prohibits the knowing possession or use of “any
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See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 8–10.
Motamedi, 767 F.2d at 1412 (Boochever, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 2–11).
248 See Clark, 543 U.S. at 380–81. Although some scholars have attempted to taxonomize constitutional avoidance decisions as strong avoidance and weak avoidance, “[t]he
Supreme Court uses both of these types of avoidance, [and] it has not yet formally distinguished them.” Eric S. Fish, Constitutional Avoidance as Interpretation and as Remedy,
114 MICH. L. REV. 1275, 1285–86 (2016).
249 Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 971 (2019) (quoting Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 842).
250 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 843 (emphasis in original) (quoting Clark, 543 U.S. at 381).
251 Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 423 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (first
quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 331 (1988); then quoting Hooper v. California, 155
U.S. 648, 657 (1895); and then quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg.
& Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
252 Ryan D. Doerfler, High-Stakes Interpretation, 116 MICH. L. REV. 523, 525 (2018).
253 572 U.S. 844 (2014).
254 Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 229).
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chemical weapon.”255 The statute defines chemical weapon to include devices designed “to cause death or other harm through
toxic properties of [ ] toxic chemicals.”256 Under the Act, “toxic
chemicals” encompasses “any chemical which . . . can cause death,
temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. The term includes all such chemicals, regardless of their
origin or of their method of production.”257 Carol Bond, having discovered her husband’s extramarital affair with her closest friend,
spread toxic chemicals over surfaces that her friend was likely to
touch.258 Bond was convicted under the Act for possessing and using a chemical weapon.259
On first impression, it might appear that the statute clearly
applied to Bond—she possessed a toxic chemical for the purpose
of causing harm to another. But Bond argued that the Act “exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers and invaded powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment.”260 Despite the
clarity of the statute, the Court—applying the avoidance canon—
construed the Act to avoid reaching purely local conduct: “But
even with its broadly worded definitions, we have doubts that a
treaty about chemical weapons has anything to do with Bond’s
conduct.”261
The willingness of courts to adopt even strained interpretations of statutes in the presence of serious constitutional questions is the result of the “high stakes” involved in a constitutional
ruling.262 In such cases, “courts have a high threshold for what
counts as ‘clear.’” 263 As a consequence, “courts require a great deal
of epistemological justification before acting on the premise that
a statute means X where reading the statute to mean X would
raise serious constitutional concerns.”264
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18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1).
18 U.S.C. § 229F(1)(B).
257 18 U.S.C. § 229F(8)(A).
258 See Bond, 572 U.S. at 852.
259 See id. at 853.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 856 (emphasis in original).
262 Doerfler, supra note 252, at 552 (“[C]ourts agree that cases involving constitutional challenges are unambiguously high stakes.”).
263 Id. at 568–69.
264 Id. at 529 ; see also id. (“Readings that would otherwise be reasonably regarded as
‘tortured’ thus become epistemologically available owing to the heightened practical
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3. Under the avoidance canon, the BRA must be
interpreted as requiring a clear and convincing evidence
standard for flight risk.
The preponderance standard for flight risk raises serious constitutional doubts by “plac[ing] in issue substantial eighth and
fifth amendment questions.”265 The current flight-risk standard is
likely constitutionally defective, especially given the justifications
for a clear and convincing evidence standard relied on in the civil
commitment line of cases.266 In those cases, the Supreme Court
unambiguously reached the constitutional question by ruling expressly on the Due Process Clause, demonstrating the gravity of
the constitutional issues here. Even to the extent that pretrial detention is distinguishable from civil commitment, the issues are
similar enough to demonstrate that there is at least a serious constitutional doubt as to the permissibility of the pretrial preponderance standard. Given the clarity with which the Court has
found the preponderance standard to be constitutionally infirm in
similar instances of nonpunitive detention, the preponderance
standard for flight risk creates serious constitutional doubt, regardless of whether avoidance can “be triggered by any constitutional doubt . . . or only by very grave doubts.”267
A construction of the BRA that avoids the constitutional issue—a clear and convincing evidence standard—is “fairly
possible.”268 The BRA is entirely silent regarding the flight-risk
standard, so a clear and convincing evidence standard would not
contradict the statutory text. The strongest interpretive argument against the clear and convincing evidence standard—that
Congress must have intended a different standard to apply to
flight risk because § 3143(a) applies a clear and convincing evidence standard to both danger and nonappearance—is based on
a weak assumption about congressional intent. Other sources indicate that Congress intended the narrower construction. As
such, even if the clear and convincing evidence standard is not the
most obvious interpretation, it is at the very least plausible,
which is all that constitutional avoidance requires.

265 Motamedi, 767 F.2d at 1409 (Boochever, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
266 See supra Part II.A.
267 Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern
Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2117 (2015).
268 Preap, 139 S. Ct. at 971 (quoting Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 842).
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The alternative interpretation is not only fairly possible, but
perhaps even the more accurate interpretation.269 But even if a
preponderance standard is more faithful to the statute’s text, the
clear and convincing evidence standard should be adopted pursuant to the avoidance canon. As Judge Boochever surmised, “A
close question of statutory construction would be presented if constitutional considerations were ignored. The balance, however,
even in that narrow context, favors use of a clear and convincing
evidence standard.”270
In sum, the constitutional doubt raised by the application of
Mathews can—and must—be avoided by a plausible construction
of the statute requiring a clear and convincing evidence standard
for flight risk.
CONCLUSION
When the circuits adopted the preponderance standard, pretrial detention was a relatively limited exception to the norm of
pretrial liberty. Given the due process protections contained in
the BRA, as well as Congress’s myopic focus on dangerousness, it
is easy to understand the nonchalance with which courts concocted the evidentiary threshold for flight risk.
In the years since the enactment of the BRA and the judicial
creation of a preponderance standard, however, pretrial detention
has transformed from the “carefully limited exception”271 to the
norm. The “exception has now swallowed the rule,” as more than
three-fourths of federal defendants are jailed before a determination of guilt.272 Not only is pretrial detention a serious intrusion
on one’s physical liberty but it also directly impacts the likelihood
of a guilty plea or conviction and the possibility of a longer sentence.273
The current state of pretrial detention warrants increased attention to the conditions that make this crisis possible, including
the misguided creation of a preponderance standard for flight
risk. The extant standard is both unconstitutional and interpretively erroneous. Due process, in this instance, requires a standard more stringent than a preponderance, and the courts’
269
270

See supra Part III.A–D.
Motamedi, 767 F.2d at 1409 (Boochever, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
271
272
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Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755.
Siegler & Harris, supra note 7.
See Didwania, supra note 5, at 1264.
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haphazard attempts to discern congressional intent misconstrue
or elide evidence that Congress likely intended a clear and convincing evidence standard for flight risk. And even if these
constitutional and interpretive arguments are not insuperable,
statutory ambiguity and constitutional doubt compel application
of the avoidance canon, independently requiring a clear and convincing evidence standard for flight risk.
The establishment of the preponderance standard for flight
risk was wrong in 1985, and it remains wrong today. It is time to
reconsider that standard. Only a clear and convincing evidence
threshold vindicates the statutory and due process rights to
which presumptively innocent individuals are entitled.

